This Article examines P2P file sharing and the copyright enforcement problem it has created through the lens of scalability. Part I traces the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
roughly forty years since its inception, the Internet has doubled in size approximately every fourteen months. 4 It is now over 170 million times bigger than its original size-an astonishing growth rate by any metric. As David Post has observed, growing a network to such a size at such a rate is no easy feat: "Turning Small into Big," he explains, "can be a tricky proposition indeed, because scaling problems-the problems that arise solely as a consequence of increasing size or increasing numbers-can be profound, and profoundly difficult to solve." 5 To make a long (and technically complicated) story short, the Internet's designers solved the problem of scale by decentralizing the transmission of data and distributing it in tiny packets throughout the entire network. 6 Because the routing function is parceled out to machines across the network, data transmission gets done much more efficiently than it would if all of the data were passing through a single, central hub. 7 As the saying goes, many hands make light work. Another key to the Internet's scalability is its capacity to grow from any point on the network. To quote Post again, "centralized networks grow radially-outward from the center, like a starfish; there's only so fast they can grow, because the center has to 'keep up' with the whole network." 8 The Internet, by contrast, "grows like a bush, each of whose terminal twigs can sprout new twigs, or like a coral reef; every machine already on the network . . . can serve as the point of attachment for a machine or machines joining the network." 9 Because the Internet can grow out from any node, "as the network grows, its ability to grow grows." 10 The bigger it gets, the bigger it can keep getting. 11 Although its size (measured in terms of the aggregate number of nodes it interconnects) is certainly impressive, the true miracle of the Internet is its unprecedented capacity to move data fast, far, and 4.
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Despite its prodigious (and always increasing) size, though, the Internet is surprisingly navigable. In 1998, Albert-László Barabasi and two of his graduate students at Notre Dame set out to determine how many degrees of separation there were between any two documents on the World Wide Web. See ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 34 (2002) . They concluded that there was an average distance of only 19 "clicks" between any two randomly chosen URLs. See id. This high degree of connectivity means that the Internet, the world's largest network, is actually classifiable as a small-world network. See id. at 31.
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See client-server network, the more demands there are on the server from individual clients, the fewer resources are available to the rest of the network. 14 If there is too much demand at any given time, the server will crash, and clients will no longer be able to obtain content at all. 15 P2P networks improve on the client-server model by decentralizing distribution, claiming bandwidth from edge nodes to transmit data, and thereby avoiding congestion at dedicated servers. 16 The more peer nodes there are on a P2P network at any given time, the greater the network's total capacity. 17 The Napster file-sharing service, which launched the P2P phenomenon, maintained a central server for indexing purposes, but no files were actually stored on or transferred through it. 18 Queries were routed through the central server, which performed a matchmaking function between peers on the network, but the file transfers themselves were unmediated. 19 Subsequent file-sharing systems, including FastTrack (used by Grokster and KaZaA) and Gnutella (used by Morpheus and LimeWire), further decentralized their architectures by eliminating the central indexing server. 20 To operational characteristics that make them appealing. First, they rely on peer nodes, not the central servers, to deliver content and therefore are more scalable. 15. Li et al., supra note 14, at 590-91 (describing the "flash crowd" effect, in which very large numbers of users all attempt to download a popular file at the same time, causing the server hosting the file to crash).
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Id. (explaining that "the effective bandwidth [of a P2P network] is scalable with respect to the number of active users"). Note that the term "peer" in the technical literature on P2P file sharing refers not to the user of the networked computer, but rather to the computer itself.
18. See generally A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Software located on the Napster servers maintains a 'search index' of Napster's collective directory.").
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See id. at 1012 (describing the architecture of the Napster system).
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See improve search efficiency without creating a bottleneck at a central indexing server, FastTrack employed mini-indexing servers, called supernodes, dispersed throughout the network, which were responsible for indexing the contents of nodes connected to them. 21 Supernodes were designated as such for their greater bandwidth and processing power relative to other peers on the network. 22 Gnutella, which did not employ supernodes, was a truly distributed P2P system, routing queries through the network from one node to the next until a node storing the desired file could be located. 23 Gnutella's purely decentralized architecture entailed longer search and discovery times than FastTrack's hybrid architecture and was therefore less efficient. 24 Although all of these P2P networks distributed the task of transferring data, enabling every peer to function as both a client and a server, they still suffered from inefficiencies and asymmetries created by free riding. 25 For example, one study of Gnutella found that 70 percent of nodes on the network downloaded content without ever uploading any. 26 From the point of view of scalability, free riding on a P2P network is doubly problematic: Not only does it decrease overall content availability, it also increases the workload for the nodes that do upload content. 27 Free riding thus produces a "tragedy of the digital commons" and effectively transforms a P2P network into a bastardized client-server network, in which some nodes decline to serve any content and act only as clients. 28 The network gets bigger without getting any richer, and its workload is poorly distributed.
B. BitTorrent: Better Scaling Through Enforced Sharing
The BitTorrent file-sharing protocol, first released in 2001, solved the problem of P2P free riding quite elegantly-by making it Adar & Huberman, supra note 26 (explaining that free-riding degrades the entire performance of the network and effectively transforms non-free-riding nodes into centralized servers).
architecturally impossible for any peer on the network to take without giving. 29 The architecture of BitTorrent, like that of FastTrack, is a hybrid P2P model. 30 File transfers occur strictly among peers, but the process requires occasional interaction with a server, called a tracker, which helps peers locate other peers offering desired content. 31 The collectivity of peers sharing a particular file at a given time according to instructions received from the tracker is called a torrent or swarm. 32 In each torrent, there are two types of peers-leechers and seeds. 33 A leecher is a peer in the process of acquiring a file. 34 A seed is a peer that already has a complete copy of the file and that remains in the torrent to serve the leechers. 35 Every torrent requires at least one seed. 36 When a leecher requests a file, the tracker sends that peer a list of other peers, usually numbering about fifty, that are already active in the torrent transferring the requested file. 37 Of the fifty peers, the leecher adds about twenty to forty as its neighbors. 38 The leecher downloads fixed-size pieces of the requested file from these neighbors, as well as from the seed. Each leecher usually serves four neighboring peers at a time. 39 As a leecher acquires new content, it simultaneously shares its content with other leechers in the torrent. 40 Unlike a client-server network, which bogs down as traffic increases, as a torrent grows, the aggregate network bandwidth of the torrent also grows. 41 For each peer in the torrent, data transfer rates are much faster than they would be in a client-server environment. 42 
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Moreover, there is no denial of service on the part of an overburdened central server, and no single source of content is overtaxed. 43 To keep the torrent operating at maximum capacity, the BitTorrent protocol uses a process called pipelining. 44 Every active peer in a torrent maintains a continuously refreshed queue of requests for pieces, so that no connection is ever left idle after any one piece is downloaded. 45 Each peer keeps track of the download rate it gets from the other peers it serves and preferentially uploads to the peers giving it the best download rates. 46 Every ten seconds, a peer reassesses the download rates it gets from the peers to which it is connected, and if another neighboring peer offers a better download rate, it temporarily chokes off the stingy peer and opens up a connection to the more generous one. 47 This "tit for tat" mechanism ensures that peers offering little or nothing to the torrent will get little or nothing from it. 48 Although BitTorrent's mandatory sharing functionality increases efficiency and scalability, the protocol is not without inefficiencies. One major problem in terms of optimizing network resources is that BitTorrent "neighbors" are neighbors in name only; the protocol selects them randomly rather than based on their proximity to the requesting user. 49 This location-unaware selection mechanism prolongs download times and over-consumes bandwidth. 50 While the former problem may represent little more than an inconvenience to users, the latter is a source of loud complaint from Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which have controversially resorted to bandwidth-shaping to limit the load of BitTorrent traffic on their networks. 51 For ISPs, then, as well as copyright owners, the scaling
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See id. ("This mechanism is very important to encourage contributors and punish free-riders, thus preventing leechers from downloading without contributing anything."). But see id. at 145 (citing a study by Andrade et al., which concluded that although the tit-for-tat protocol discourages free-riding successfully, the mechanism may not work as well if there is a large number of seeds in the torrent).
49.
See id. at 140 (identifying BitTorrent's random neighbor selection mechanism as one of the most widely criticized aspects of the protocol).
50. up of BitTorrent networks has come at a price, though lack of reliable data makes it difficult to know how high a price or exactly how high a proportion of overall network traffic P2P transfers represent. 52 One study conducted from 2008 to 2009, which did not include ISPs in the United States, concluded that P2P traffic generated the highest percentage of overall network traffic in all regions studied, ranging from 43 percent in Northern Africa to 70 percent in Eastern Europe. 53 (These percentages were down from a previous study in 2007, but the absolute volume of P2P traffic did not decline.) 54 The same study found that BitTorrent dominated all other protocols, including HTTP, the protocol that carries ordinary web-browsing traffic. 55 A 2009 study of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) traffic on a major European ISP found the percentage of P2P traffic to be much lower-roughly 14 percent. 56 The authors of the 2009 study also found, however, that P2P users have longer sessions than non-P2P users, and that a larger percentage of P2P users are always connected. 57 This pair of findings from the 2009 study suggests that P2P users are more demanding of resources than their non-P2P counterparts.
Id. see also
To make the BitTorrent protocol even more efficient and less bandwidth intensive, computer scientists have been working on design for discriminating against traffic solely on the basis of protocol, the U.S. 
C. P2P Past Its Peak: The Recentralization of Online Infringement
While studies attempting to measure P2P traffic reach different conclusions on the numbers, they agree that recent traffic trends show more growth elsewhere, particularly in the HTTP protocol. 60 The resurgence of HTTP has several causes: The increased popularity of streaming media and video-on-demand sites (e.g., YouTube, Hulu, and Netflix); the explosion of social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter); and the migration of users to online file-hosting services, known as cyberlockers or Direct Download Links (DDLs) (e.g., Megaupload and RapidShare). 61 63 In a recent filing with the FCC, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) described the proliferation of file-hosting sites as a manifestation of increasing fragmentation in the online market for infringing content. 64 The International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) made a similar observation about fragmentation in its 2010 Digital Music Report, citing a U.K. study which found that although P2P remains the major platform for online piracy, illegal distribution through other channels, including Usenet groups and cyberlockers, grew significantly in 2009. 65 Cyberlocker sites rely on a centralized architecture and thus seem to represent a step backwards in the evolution toward completely distributed networks. 66 This recentralization makes life easier for copyright owners, because centralized content distribution systems, unlike distributed ones, provide static and easily identifiable targets for litigation and other enforcement efforts. 67 When a system is as large, dynamic, and decentralized as a P2P network, trying to shut it down by targeting individual nodes is a losing proposition. 68 Some nodes will be more connected than others, and destruction of these highly connected nodes will be relatively more damaging to the network as a whole, but a very large distributed network will survive The use of adjectives denoting great scale (e.g., terms like "vast" and "massive") to describe the problem of P2P piracy has long been a rhetorical strategy of the copyright industries, which have thereby sought to impress upon legislatures and courts both the magnitude of the problem they face and the need for urgent and decisive action. 71 Although not particularly subtle, the strategy has been quite effective, judging from the number of court decisions that incorporate the industry's scale-conscious rhetoric. The cases against P2P software distributors going back to A&M Records v. Napster are strewn with references to the "massive" scale of P2P infringement. 72
69.
See id. at 1316-18 (suggesting that targeting of supernodes or hubs might be more successful than random attacks). In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Justice Souter wrote of the "gigantic scale" and "staggering" scope of the alleged infringement. 73 Similar language permeates the cases against individual file-sharers. In Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Bryant, for example, the court wrote that "the process [of P2P file sharing] is potentially exponential rather than linear, threatening virtually unstoppable infringement of the copyright." 74 In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v . Streeter, the court described P2P technology as leaving the plaintiffs' works "vulnerable to massive, repeated, and worldwide infringement." 75 When it comes to online infringement, the industry's clarion message has been that scale changes everything: If the problem were smaller and more localized-if the potential losses were not so easily multiplied-the situation would be much less dire for industry plaintiffs, and the need for immediate relief less acute.
The copyright industries have targeted Congress, as well as the courts, with the message that size matters. Transcripts of legislative hearings on file sharing are full of scale-conscious language. In this context, members of the House Judiciary Committee have characterized file sharing as an "epidemic," 76 citing dramatic statistics to prove its "devastating impact" on the entertainment industry. 77 tre appears to be the facilitation of and contribution to copyright infringement on a massive scale"); id. at 649 (referring to "the ongoing, massive, and unauthorized distribution and copying of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works"); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (referring to "the massive downloading of MP3 files by Napster users"); id. at 925 (finding that "the evidence establishes that unauthorized sharing of plaintiffs' copyrighted music occurred on a massive scale"); id. at 926 (citing "statistical evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and uploading of plaintiffs' copyrighted works").
73 80 This official message of titanic loss has been so consistent over time, and delivered so often to so many audiences, that it is now taken for granted from hearing rooms to court rooms to news rooms. There is garden variety infringement, the industries' logic goes, but then there is "massive infringement," for which the Internet is to blame and which differs so much in degree from what came before that it begs to be treated as different in kind.
B. The Challenge of Measuring Massive Infringement
As with estimates of P2P traffic as a proportion of total Internet traffic, estimates of infringing traffic as a proportion of total P2P traffic have varied over time and among sources. In the literature on P2P, much of it authored by trade groups representing corporate rights owners, a commonplace claim is that piracy accounts largely, if not overwhelmingly, for the traffic on P2P networks. 81 P2P plaintiffs have repeatedly made this claim, and courts have generally found it to be vindicated by credible evidence, including expert testimony. MGM's expert statistician in Grokster found that nearly 90 percent of the files available on the FastTrack system were copyrighted, and the Court was persuaded that the "vast majority" of downloads were, in fact, infringing. 82 More recently, the court in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC credited Arista's expert's testimony that 98.8 percent of the files requested for download on the LimeWire system were copyrighted and not authorized for free 78 .
Protecting distribution. 83 In Columbia Pictures v. Fung, a case involving secondary infringement claims against the operators of the isoHunt and TorrentBox torrent tracker sites, Columbia's expert testified that over 90 percent of the downloads available through the sites were copyright protected. 84 In a decision granting Columbia's motion for summary judgment, the court found that the defendant, Fung, had failed to call the opposing expert's conclusions into doubt or to rebut the expert's statement that he relied on standard statistical sampling techniques to arrive at the numbers in his report. 85 Even if the percentages were not actually as high as the expert reported, the court said, there was no question that a substantial percentage of the available files were infringing-enough to prove the plaintiff's claims. 86 Outside the context of expert testimony and industry white papers, data on the percentage of P2P traffic that is copyright infringing are difficult to locate, but the available data tend to corroborate industry assertions that the bulk of files available on P2P networks are infringing. 87 Australian researchers from the University of Ballarat reported in 2010 that 89 percent of all torrents-97.9 percent of all non-pornographic torrents-in a sample of over one million were infringing. 88 Of the torrents in the top three categories by volume-movies, TV shows, and music-there were no legal torrents in the study's sample. 89 To highlight the difficulty of finding truly independent statistics, it is worth noting that the study, though released under the auspices of the Internet Commerce Security Laboratory, was supported by a major Australian movie and DVD distributor. 90 In a smaller study, apparently without industry ties, a student researcher at Princeton University found that all of the movie, TV, and music torrents in a sample consisting of 1021 files were likely 83 
C. The Challenge of Measuring Massive Infringement's Harms
Reliable and independent numbers are even more elusive when it comes to measuring file sharing's economic impact on the copyright industries and the U.S. economy as a whole. The claims made by industry representatives are, not surprisingly, quite dramatic. In comments to the FCC in 2010, the MPAA asserted that online infringement costs U.S. creative industries billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs annually. 93 A 2007 study often cited by industry trade groups estimated annual losses on the same order of magnitude: $58 billion in total output, over 370,000 jobs, and $2.6 billion in tax revenue. 94 These estimates, the methodologies that produced them, and the assumptions on which they rely have been challenged on their merits 95 and countered by at least one major study whose authors attempted to look at the other side of the coin, assessing the value added to the economy by industries that rely on fair uses of copyrighted works. 96 As required by the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act), the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined existing research on the economic effects of counterfeiting and piracy. 97 In a report released in
91.
See 2010, the GAO concluded that economic loss estimates widely cited by the government could not be substantiated due to the absence of underlying studies. 98 In attempting to discover the origin of the estimates, the GAO learned from government officials that the numbers came directly from industry; 99 they were neither independently reviewed nor supported by any disclosure of data or methodology. 100 To all appearances, corporate rights owners have been laundering their loss statistics to win support for their legislative and enforcement agendas: They submit estimates to government officials, who uncritically quote the estimates in government documents, which industry representatives then quote to the media as official proof of the losses piracy causes. 101 By means of this circuit, numbers based on questionable assumptions and emanating from sources with a vested interest in their inflation acquire a false air of objectivity and empirical soundness. Because policy and enforcement apparatuses informed by skewed statistics are bound to produce skewed priorities and initiatives, the GAO report should stand as a reminder to policy makers of the need for disinterested data gathering and assessment.
There is, however, some truth behind the hype. Notwithstanding the copyright industries' propensity to exaggerate their losses, or the fastness and looseness with which their statistics are (re)circulated by uncritical government officials and media outlets, there can be little question that P2P networks have facilitated largescale infringement, or that the volume of files traded illegally by means of such networks has been, and remains, large and revenuedepleting. As the GAO concluded, without factitious precision, "the problem is sizeable." 102 98.
GENERAL 
A. "Scaling Up" Enforcement to Facilitate Growth
The legislative history of the DMCA frames the statute as a means of ensuring the continued global growth of the Internet. 103 To facilitate that goal, the statute was crafted to minimize obstacles to growth for both content providers, who would not expand the digital distribution of their works without assurances that they would be protected from "massive piracy," and service providers, 104 who would not expand their sites and networks without assurances that they would be protected from massive liability for copyright infringement. 105 In light of the legislative history's focus on promoting Internet growth, the DMCA can be understood as a mechanism for simultaneously scaling up online copyright enforcement and scaling back online copyright liability-a unified solution designed to give rights owners the security necessary to expand content distribution and service providers the security necessary to expand applications and network infrastructure.
The DMCA scales up enforcement while scaling back liability through provisions in Title I that prohibit circumvention of technological protection measures 106 and provisions in Title II that create safe harbors for service providers, conditioned on their assisting rights owners in the expeditious resolution of online copyright infringement disputes. 107 There are two provisions from Title II on which copyright owners have relied heavily in their efforts to make enforcement scale for the digital environment: § 512(c), which establishes the notice-and-takedown framework for which the DMCA is most well-known, 108 and § 512(h), which allows rights owners to 103.
See S. REP. NO.105-190, at 1-2 (1998) ("The 'Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998' is designed to facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the digital age.").
104.
In the statute, the term "service provider" is defined broadly to include both providers of Internet access (ISPs) and providers of online services. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (2006).
105. See S. REP. NO.105-190, at 8 ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy. . . . At the same time, without clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet.").
106. serve subpoenas on service providers outside of litigation to obtain the identities of alleged infringers. 109 Tacitly premised on the reality that litigation is not an efficient means of resolving the voluminous infringement claims that arise in the context of online services, § 512(c) and § 512(h) require service providers to act cooperatively with rights owners, without intervention from a court, to remove allegedly infringing content from their services and to identify those ostensibly responsible for its distribution.
B. The DMCA's Scalability for Hosted Content
Notwithstanding initial resistance from both camps, service providers and rights owners have adapted quite well over the last decade to doing business within the parameters defined by the DMCA's notice-and-takedown system. 110 On YouTube, for example, the § 512(c) notice process is fully automated for both individual and corporate rights owners. 111 Facebook also offers a standardized online notice form, 112 and Scribd provides DMCA-compliant templates for both notices and counter-notices. 113 On these popular content-sharing sites, the notice-and-takedown system has come to operate as a welloiled, always-on copyright enforcement machine.
Notwithstanding this fact, corporate rights owners have argued since the DMCA's enactment, and more loudly since the dawn of Web 2.0 and the user-generated content (UGC) revolution, that the noticeand-takedown machinery in the DMCA is inadequate to protect their 109. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) ("A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer . . . . The request may be made by filing with the clerk . . . a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A); a proposed subpoena; and a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under this title.").
110. 114 Viacom has pressed this argument, so far unsuccessfully, in its closely watched lawsuit against YouTube. 115 In an opinion granting YouTube's motion for summary judgment based on the company's consistent compliance with the terms of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions, the court rejected Viacom's contention that the notice-and-takedown system is an enforcement failure. 116 On the contrary, the court concluded, evidence in the record suggested that the system is both functional and efficient: "Indeed, the present case shows that the DMCA notification regime works efficiently: When Viacom over a period of months accumulated some 100,000 videos and then sent one mass take-down notice on February 2, 2007, by the next business day YouTube had removed virtually all of them." 117 Viacom's power to eliminate 100,000 instances of alleged infringement overnight, with a single notice, is a testament to the DMCA's success in making online enforcement scalable without creating growth-inhibiting burdens for online services like YouTube, whose business models are founded on content sharing. Although copyright owners continue to advocate a judicial interpretation of the DMCA that would require sites like YouTube to be more proactive in their efforts to enforce third-party copyrights, the DMCA is quite clear that active monitoring for infringing content is not a burden that
114.
See the burden entirely onto copyright owners to monitor the YouTube site on a daily or hourly basis to detect infringing videos and send notices to YouTube demanding that it 'take down' the infringing works." Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶ 6, Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (No. 1:07CV02103). In reality, the law puts that burden squarely on rights owners like Viacom; the DMCA expressly does not condition eligibility for safe harbor on a service provider's monitoring its service for infringing content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2006) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity . . . ."). Viacom thus asked the court to hold YouTube liable for a sin of omission that the law does not recognize as a sin at all. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra. It is interesting to note that Viacom's complaint is full of the scale-conscious rhetoric discussed in Part II above. For example, Viacom alleged that "YouTube has harnessed technology to willfully infringe copyrights on a huge scale," id. ¶ 2, that "YouTube appropriates the value of creative content on a massive scale," id. ¶ 2, that "a vast amount" of the content available on YouTube is infringing," id. ¶ 3, and that YouTube has "done little or nothing to prevent this massive infringement," id. ¶ 5.
116. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
117.
Congress saw fit to allocate to service providers when it balanced the need to make the Internet safe for copyright owners against the need to promote growth and innovation in online services. 118
C. The Costs of Scalable Enforcement
There are, of course, downsides to a system designed to avoid the delay and expense of litigation by facilitating the overnight removal of 100,000 allegedly infringing files. Along with such efficiency comes the potential for abuse by copyright owners. For example, notices of infringement have been used to censor speech that copyright owners find offensive and to suppress unlicensed uses of copyrighted works that are colorably fair; 119 similarly, DMCA prelitigation subpoenas have been used as a pretext for identifying constitutionally protected anonymous speakers. 120 While the DMCA does contain provisions designed to protect users from notices sent in bad faith 121 and to enable the restoration of wrongfully removed material, 122 it is unclear whether these safeguards are as protective of users' rights in practice as they are in theory. 123 Forced to choose between protecting themselves from liability and protecting the
118.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Although it is not required to do so by the DMCA, YouTube maintains an automated audio and video identification system by means of which infringing content can be blocked, tracked, or monetized, as the copyright owner prefers. 124 In this regard, the DMCA's mechanisms for streamlining dispute resolution are not without costs. Rights owners like Viacom focus exclusively on the costs of underenforcement, but over-enforcement is an equally problematic artifact of § 512's workable-though-imperfect design for making online copyright enforcement scalable for hosted content.
D. The DMCA's Failure to Scale for P2P
It is not the end of the story, however, to say that the DMCA's enforcement machinery has proven to be scalable with respect to service providers that host content for users. The DMCA has not scaled well for enforcing copyrights infringed by means of P2P filesharing networks, because the statute was designed primarily to address infringements that occur when users upload copyrighted material to a provider's servers or link to infringing content posted by others. 125 When it enacted the DMCA, Congress did not anticipate the distributed nature of P2P networks or the correspondingly distributed nature of the infringement they would enable.
High-volume infringement is relatively easy to detect and combat when the content in question is fixed on the servers of easily identifiable intermediaries with duly designated DMCA agents; 126 it becomes much harder to detect and combat when that content is in transit across a distributed network whose membership is anonymous and dynamic.
The safe harbor provisions of § 512 cover four types of service provider functions: transitory digital network communications (i.e., routing and transmission), system caching, storage on behalf of users,
124.
This tendency is encouraged by the DMCA's absolution of ISPs for good faith removal of material that is ultimately found to be non-infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). As Seth Kreimer has explained, "if it is costly to distinguish protected from unprotected speech, the proxy censor is likely to abandon the effort to avoid errors and adopt a conscious policy of prophylactic self-censorship that blocks any content that could precipitate the threat of sanctions." Kreimer, supra note 119, at 28. See also Mark Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115 (2007) ("Notice and takedown therefore rewards overzealous copyright owners who use the DMCA mechanism to rid the Web even of legitimate content, secure in the expectation that ISPs will take everything down rather than risk their eligibility for the safe harbor."). and information location. 127 Service providers performing each of these functions, with the significant exception of routing and transmission, are required to comply with the notice-and-takedown framework in § 512(c). 128 The DMCA's primary focus on useruploaded material residing on the systems of service providers reflects the then-current state of the art in network architecture. 129 Before P2P file-sharing applications came onto the scene, the most copyrightrelevant function an online service provider performed was storage on behalf of users-the function covered by the safe harbor in § 512(c). 130 In P2P networks, however, files are not uploaded to a provider's server; they remain instead on the users' own systems, from which other users directly retrieve them. 131 In this architecture, the most copyright-relevant functions a service provider performs are routing and transmission-the functions covered by the safe harbor in § 512(a). 132 Because the DMCA was designed to deal with providers serving a centralized file-storage function, it has proven a poor fit in cases involving P2P, where the service provider functions only as a pass-through or conduit for the transfer of infringing material. 133 The DMCA's exemption of providers of routing and transmission services (a.k.a. "mere conduits") from the notice-andtakedown requirements in § 512(c) is entirely consistent with the fact that such providers do not store or control user content. 134 Nevertheless, the exemption has operated in the context of P2P file sharing to negate the scalable enforcement mechanism that notice and takedown provides. Inasmuch as P2P file sharing shifts the locus of infringing activity from the storage function to the transmission function, it places such activity beyond the knowledge and control of 127.
See id. § 512(a)-(d). 128.
For providers of system caching, the requirement is found at § 512(b)(2)(E). For providers of storage on behalf of users, the requirement is found at § 512(c)(1)(C). For providers of information location tools, the requirement is found at § 512(d)(3). There is no corresponding requirement for providers of routing and transmission services.
129 that the absence of the notification and remove-or-disable-access provisions from § 512(a) "makes sense where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for infringing material . . . because the ISP has no ability to remove the infringing material from its system or disable access to the infringing material"). [Vol. 13:4:695 the ISP and thus beyond the reach of the enforcement scheme created by § 512(c). 135 As a consequence of the exemption of conduit providers from the notice and takedown requirements of § 512(c), the expedited subpoena provision in the DMCA- § 512(h)-has also been held inapplicable to these providers. 136 This is because the application for a subpoena under § 512(h) must include a copy of the notice described in § 512(c)(3)(A). 137 The notice described in § 512(c)(3)(A) must identify, among other things, "the material that is claimed to be infringing . . . and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled" by the service provider. 138 In reaching the conclusion that the subpoena power in § 512(h) cannot be held to extend to providers covered by § 512(a), the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. and Eighth Circuits found it dispositive that § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown requirements do not apply on the face of the statute to providers that act simply as conduits for information. 139 After all, how can § 512(h), which expressly requires an applicant to submit a copy of a notice compliant with § 512(c), apply to providers that are not subject to § 512(c) in the first place? 140 It makes more sense to conclude, as these Circuits did, that the references to § 512(c) in § 512(h) restrict the applicability of § 512(h) to providers that are able to remove or disable access to specific material. 141 In short, courts have held, there is an assumption 135 . Although in-network filtering and blocking technologies have greatly evolved since the passage of the DMCA, and broadband providers actively manage network traffic in ways that were not then possible, the statute presupposes a passive transit model; § 512(a) requires that material be transmitted through the qualifying provider's system "through an automatic technical process and without selection of the material by the service provider." 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2) (2006 See Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 776 (explaining that each safe harbor that covers a function allowing the ISP to remove or disable access to infringing material (i.e., storage, system caching, or linking) contains a remove-or-disable access provision); Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37 ("We agree that the presence in § 512(h) of three separate references to § 512(c) and the absence of any reference to § 512(a) suggests the subpoena power of § 512(h) applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted material and not to those engaged solely in transmitting it on behalf of others.").
140. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37. I have argued elsewhere that judicial interpretations of § 512(i)-the DMCA's repeat infringer provision, which applies to all types of providers seeking safe harbor under § 512-have potentially created a "back door" requirement for conduit providers to have in place a system for receiving and responding to notices of infringement sent by rights owners. underlying § 512(h) that a subpoena recipient will actually be in a position to take down material identified as infringing.
It is possible, perhaps even probable, that § 512(h) would have been written differently if P2P technology had existed at the time of the DMCA's drafting. 142 In light of that possibility, rights owners have persuaded some judges that the subpoena provision should be held to apply to service providers covered by §512(a), despite the assumption underlying § 512(h) that subpoena recipients can remove or disable access to specific material. 143 In the face of unanticipated technological developments, these judges look past the letter of the DMCA to make it scale for P2P file sharing. Such recuperative acts are plainly beyond the judiciary's competence, however, as the D.C.
Circuit said in Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services:
It is not the province of the courts . . . to rewrite the DMCA in order to make it fit a new and unfor[e]seen [I]nternet architecture, no matter how damaging that development has been to the music industry or threatens being to the motion picture and software industries. The plight of copyright holders must be addressed in the first instance by the Congress . . . . 144
In the absence of Congressional action to bring P2P file sharing and the providers whose networks are used for it within the scope of § § 512(c) and (h) of the DMCA, rights owners cannot avail themselves of the statute's mechanisms for making online copyright enforcement scalable by allowing it to operate outside of litigation. When it comes to P2P file sharers, rights owners must sue to enforce their copyrights and, for that matter, even to figure out whom to sue.
E. A Perverse Consequence of the DMCA's Failure to Scale for P2P
In her dissent in Charter Communications, the Eighth Circuit case that interpreted § 512(h) to exclude § 512(a) providers, Judge Murphy emphasized the negative implications of the majority's holding for the DMCA's goal of making online copyright enforcement scalable:
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See While Judge Murphy's observations concerning the practical consequences of a narrow interpretation of § 512(h) are unarguable, her colleagues rightly declined to "contort the statute" to make it applicable in P2P cases. 146 Unable to use the DMCA's expedited subpoena provision to uncover the identities of alleged P2P infringers, rights owners predictably fell back on filing John Doe lawsuits and seeking expedited discovery under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to identify accused file sharers. 147 To counteract the massive scale of P2P infringement, the RIAA vowed to fight fire with fire, suing massive numbers of file sharers beginning in 2003. 148 In an effort to make the litigation scalable, it named hundreds of John Doe defendants per filing in a coordinated legal campaign similar to mass tort litigation, but with the aggregation occurring on the defendant's side-a rarity in the world of aggregate proceedings. 149 The first RIAA case targeted 261 John Doe defendants, with a promise of thousands more to follow. 150 By the time the RIAA ended its John Doe campaign in late 2008, it had sued more than 30,000 individuals. 151 Although the number of actual cases filed did not approach that number, given the RIAA's practice of aggregating defendants, the campaign coincided with a substantial increase in the copyright caseload in the perennially overburdened federal district courts. By way of comparison, the total number of new copyright cases filed between 2001 and 2003 was 6,599. 152 154 In 2009, following the conclusion of the RIAA's campaign, the number of new cases dropped back down to approximately the level at which it had been in 2004. 155 The number of new filings has spiked again, however, thanks in part to the efforts of two law firms that have taken up the mantle the RIAA laid down in 2008. Operating as the U.S. Copyright Group, the D.C. area firm of Dunlap, Grubb & Weaver filed suits in 2010 on behalf of a handful of independent filmmakers alleging infringement by over 14,000 individual John Doe file sharers. 156 In a single filing, over 4,500 individuals were sued for using BitTorrent to download the film Far Cry. 157 In another case, 5,000 Does were accused of illegally downloading The Hurt Locker. 158 152. See infra Appendix A.
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See infra Appendix A. Not all of these cases, of course, were file sharing cases.
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See infra Appendix A.
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See infra Appendix A. Of course, the intent of plaintiffs and their counsel in these cases is not to litigate the claims to judgment; the goal is to secure a high volume of quick settlements, transacted online, in the range of a few thousand dollars apiece. 160 As Julie Cohen noted with respect to the RIAA litigation, low filing and overhead costs allow these settlement programs to operate as a profit center for copyright owners. 161 Once an individual John Doe settles by making an electronic payment and accepting a standardized settlement agreement drafted by the plaintiff's counsel, he or she is dismissed from the case and thereby relieved of both the stress of litigation and the cost of hiring counsel. 162 Those who decline to settle are named and remain on the docket as parties. 163 Attempting to scale up copyright infringement litigation by naming hundreds or thousands of John Doe defendants in a single action not only makes for unmanageable dockets and a potential three-ring circus of pre-trial motions, it also creates insoluble due process problems relating to joinder, venue, and personal jurisdiction. 162. See Opderbeck, supra note 149, at 1705 (describing the modus operandi in the RIAA cases).
163.
Id.
RIAA case, a district court in Pennsylvania held sua sponte that 202 of 203 John Doe defendants had been improperly joined. 164 The court concluded that "wholesale litigation" of such disparate claims was not appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that it would be both "convenient and economical" from the plaintiff's point of view for the case to go forward. 165 A district court in Florida required severance of twenty-four out of twenty-five John Does in another RIAA case, citing unrelated parties and facts, unreasonable prejudice and expense to defendants, and substantial inconvenience in the administration of justice. 166 Courts in Ohio, 167 North Carolina, 168 and New York 169 also severed defendants in RIAA cases, citing the same reasons. Other courts, including the court in the post-RIAA Far Cry litigation, have allowed the cases to go forward; these courts have attempted, however, to streamline the Rule 45 process in a way that is fair to defendants by requiring the distribution of a court-approved standardized notice to every Internet user whose IP address is listed in the plaintiff's subpoena. 170 The notice in the Far Cry suit informs recipients that their identities will be disclosed by their ISPs in thirty days, unless they elect either to settle the suit or to file a motion to quash. 171 The notice also informs recipients that they may challenge the court's personal jurisdiction over them. 172 [Vol. 13:4:695
Even if thousands of the defendants in the U.S. Copyright Group and Adult Copyright Company cases elect to settle at a very early stage in the litigation, it is all but impossible to imagine how these cases could progress through discovery as a practical matter; severance is inevitable. 173 Courts that postpone severance and require issuance of special notices effectively channel defendants into the plaintiffs' high-volume settlement apparatus and, by doing so, both deprive the courts of revenue and provide incentives for massive (mis)joinder in future cases. 174 Considering the significant procedural due process and administration of justice issues associated with mass John Doe litigation, it is hard to imagine a compelling argument in favor of adjudicating online copyright disputes in this way. If the defendants in these suits were severed, the due process problems arising from mass joinder would be solved, and the courts would collect filing fees more accurately reflective of the number of controversies over which they are being asked to preside. Conversely, however, severance would swell both copyright caseloads for courts and enforcement costs for plaintiffs.
Simply put, litigation is not a scalable mechanism for dealing with the high volume of copyright disputes that arise from P2P file sharing; trying to make litigation scale by aggregating thousands of defendants in a single suit is efficient for plaintiffs, but the attendant costs for defendants and the justice system as a whole are unacceptably high. Including thousands of allegedly infringing files in a single § 512(c) takedown notice is a workable way of killing lots of birds with one stone when it comes to hosted content, but including thousands of defendants in a single copyright infringement lawsuit is 173. Matters concerning severance, including the timing of it, are within the court's discretion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (providing that a court, on motion or on its own, may "at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party" or "sever any claim against a party"). 
IV. MORE SCALABLE ALTERNATIVES: COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. Amendment of § 512(h) versus "Notice and Notice"
Congress could amend § 512(h) of the DMCA to reach § 512(a) providers; that is, the statute could be amended to permit issuance of a subpoena upon submission of either a copy of a notice compliant with § 512(c)(3)(a) or a notice identifying the IP address of the alleged infringer's computer, along with information sufficient to establish the date, time, and content of the allegedly infringing transmission. these decisions, if Congress were inclined to amend the DMCA to allow rights owners to identify alleged P2P infringers outside the litigation context, privacy-based arguments raised in opposition would be unlikely to undermine the amendment. Amending § 512(h), however, is neither the only nor the optimal way of creating a scalable, out-of-court framework within which rights owners can warn alleged infringers of their potential liability and thereby deter them from using P2P networks to infringe. For several years, broadband ISPs have been entering into private agreements with corporate rights owners under which they have agreed to pass along notices of infringement to their subscribers. In 2005, the year in which the Eighth Circuit decided Charter, Verizon agreed to forward notices of infringement for Disney; in return, it received the right to transmit certain Disney programming over its network. 178 In late 2009, Verizon agreed to forward notices for the RIAA. 179 Comcast is also a party to notice-forwarding agreements. 180 Through these "notice and notice" arrangements, ISPs can assist rights owners in enforcing their copyrights in the P2P context without disclosing subscribers' identities and thereby compromising subscribers' privacy. 181 After Congress declined to amend § 512(h) to overturn the results in Verizon and Charter, ISPs and rights owners stepped into the breach to reach a compromise among themselves that serves the interests of both privacy and efficiency. By dispensing altogether with pre-litigation subpoenas, the notice-and-notice framework streamlines P2P copyright enforcement while simultaneously protecting subscribers' privacy. Copyright owners are afforded a means of warning alleged infringers, and ISPs can facilitate that communication without handing over their users' personally identifying information.
B. Graduated Response and ADR for P2P
Since 2008, trade groups representing corporate rights owners have been lobbying worldwide for the adoption of graduated response or "three strikes" protocols as an alternative to mass litigation. 183 Pursuant to these protocols, ISPs either privately agree, or are statutorily required, to terminate Internet access for subscribers deemed to be "repeat infringers." 184 Several countries, including the U.K., France, South Korea, and Taiwan, have already incorporated graduated response into their domestic copyright enforcement systems. 185 Similar legislation is making its way through the legislative process in New Zealand, 186 10628193 (describing the controversy surrounding the implementation of graduated response in New Zealand, including the repeal of Section 92A of the Copyright Act, and the introduction of purposes of DMCA compliance, are unhelpfully split on the question. Some have said that notices of infringement from a copyright owner, taken on their own, are sufficient to trigger the duty to terminate a subscriber's access under the DMCA. 194 Others have said that such notices do not provide sufficient evidence of repeat infringement, because they could be erroneous. 195 No court has quantified the number of infringements that puts the "repeat" in "repeat infringer." 196 Given the lack of judicial consensus on the repeat infringer question, the relationship between graduated response and DMCA compliance is murky. While it seems clear that adoption of a three-strikes-and-you're-out protocol would satisfy the DMCA's requirement of reasonable implementation of a policy for terminating the access of repeat infringers, the statute is drafted to give ISPs latitude in crafting and implementing repeat infringer policies, and courts have protected that latitude. 197 Their decisions track David Nimmer's suggestion that a mechanical understanding of compliance with § 512(i) should give way to an objective good faith standard. 198 While voluntary adoption of graduated response regimes by broadband providers would create a scalable, out-of-court framework for enforcing copyrights in the P2P context, ten years of experience with the notice-and-takedown regime for hosted content have demonstrated that there is a significant risk of abuse inherent in a system that streamlines enforcement by dispensing with the neutral adjudication of claims.
Moreover, the stakes of procedural [Vol. 13:4:695 streamlining are much higher for users when the sanction at issue is suspension or termination of Internet access as opposed to the removal of isolated content. The stakes are higher for broadband providers, too, insofar as suspension of access entails suspension of revenue. ISPs, predictably, are vocally opposed to graduated response to the extent that it requires them to sit in judgment of their customers. In recent comments to the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), AT&T executive James Cicconi sharply criticized the notion that ISPs are positioned to fairly and responsibly administer graduated response protocols:
The government and the courts, not ISPs, are responsible for intellectual property enforcement, and only they can secure and balance the various property, privacy and due process rights that are at play and often in conflict in this realm . . . . The notion of non-governmental players assuming, without legal authority, a governmental role simply would not endure. 199 With these risks and stakes in mind, Cicconi recommended that the government assume responsibility for a "court-administered adjudication process" that relies upon a "streamlined claims adjudication body" to resolve civil infringement claims against file sharers and other alleged online infringers. 200 What Cicconi wants, in other words, is a specialized form of ADR for P2P-a shift from litigation to administration roughly analogous to the one that Richard Nagareda has traced in the mass tort system. 201 In the mass tort context, Nagareda views the evolution toward administrative frameworks for mass dispute resolution partially in terms of scalability: "The sheer numbers of claims, their geographic breadth, their reach across time to unidentified future claimants, and their factual patterns, together, demand the kind of systematized treatment characteristic of administrative processes." 202 The elements of numerosity and geographic breadth, which Nagareda sees as contributing to the unworkability of a litigation-driven mass tort system, are also present in a litigation-driven system for adjudicating claims of P2P copyright infringement. Given these commonalities, P2P infringement claims, like mass tort claims, may be better managed administratively than judicially.
1. An ADR System Modeled on ICANN's UDRP The idea of a dedicated, publicly administered alternative dispute resolution system for adjudicating online copyright infringement claims has been raised before. In 2005, Mark Lemley and Anthony Reese proposed amending the Copyright Act to create a system modeled on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) for adjudicating disputes over trademarks in domain names. 203 Under Lemley and Reese's system, a copyright owner seeking to enforce a copyright against a P2P infringer could forego civil litigation in favor of an administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Copyright Office. 204 Such a proceeding would be limited to cases in which the copyright owner could produce evidence that the targeted individual uploaded at least fifty copyrighted works during a thirty day period-a threshold intended to keep cases of de minimis or isolated infringement out of the system. 205 In addition to imposing a quantitative threshold, Lemley and Reese incorporate a qualitative limit on the type of claims to be decided administratively: Only clear-cut cases would be subject to administrative adjudication. Any case in which the accused infringer could present evidence of a genuine factual dispute or a viable claim of fair use would be kicked out of the system without prejudice to the complainant's right to bring a civil suit in court. 206 For cases straightforward enough to remain in the administrative system, Lemley and Reese build in procedural protections for accused infringers, including the right to present evidence rebutting allegations, the right to appeal a finding of liability, and the right to [Vol. 13:4:695 seek penalties against complainants for bringing frivolous or bad-faith claims. 207 The system scales by foregoing face-to-face argument and litigation-style discovery, but only in uncomplicated cases, leaving legitimately contested claims to a forum in which they can be fully aired. The recognition that hard cases are unsuitable for expedited adjudication is as much a key to the scalability of the ADR system that Lemley and Reese propose as the recognition that most file sharing cases are, both in law and in fact, easy ones.
For ISPs, a key advantage of a system like Lemley and Reese's is the allocation of responsibility for adjudicating claims of online infringement to a neutral third party. Another advantage is the removal of ambiguity concerning who should be counted as a repeat infringer for purposes of DMCA compliance. Lemley and Reese attempt to give stable meaning to § 512(i)'s requirement of termination for repeat infringers by expressly defining a repeat infringer as any user who is twice found liable in administrative proceedings. 208 An ISP seeking to remain eligible for safe harbor under the DMCA would be required to terminate access for any user who meets this definition. Lemley and Reese attempt to strike a balance on repeat infringement: To make enforcement more efficient for rights owners, they do not require civil judgments of infringement to trigger the ISP's duty to terminate; at the same time, to protect users from enforcement mistakes and abuses, they do not treat notices of infringement from rights owners as sufficient to trigger the duty. 209 To ameliorate the harshness associated with the prospect of "exile" from the Internet, Lemley and Reese envision a five-year time limit on termination and a period of public education between the passage of enabling legislation and the actual implementation of their system. 210 Needless to say, an administrative copyright tribunal designed to make enforcement scalable in the context of P2P has not become part of the enforcement landscape in the United States. The role outlined for the Copyright Office in IPEC's 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement is strictly supportive and
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Id. at 2-3. 208.
The two-strikes repeat infringer protocol that Lemley and Reese describe may seem at first glance to be more draconian than the three-strikes protocol advocated by rights owners in connection with graduated response; however, because Lemley and Reese set a fifty-file jurisdictional minimum for each administrative claim, a user cannot be designated a repeat infringer under their protocol without having shared at least a hundred copyrighted files. See id. at 4.
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Id. at 13 ("Keying the termination obligation to an administrative finding would protect the due process rights of those wrongfully accused of infringement without rendering the repeat infringer provision altogether ineffective.").
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Id. at 14. A five-year suspension seems unduly long, but Lemley and Reese are not committed to so long a period.
educational. 211 Whether the idea of a specialized ADR system for P2P can gain traction domestically, six years after Lemley and Reese's proposal and well beyond the peak of the P2P "crisis," may depend on the perceived success or failure of such systems abroad. The newly implemented HADOPI system in France is sure to be the bellwether.
France's HADOPI System
The seeds for governmentally administered graduated response in France were sown in 2004, when the concept was first mentioned in a report of France's High Council of Literary and Artistic Property. 212 The report recommended implementation of a system requiring broadband providers to send a specific number of warnings to users suspected of infringement, after which a fine would be imposed. 213 When France amended its copyright law in 2006 in compliance with EU directive 2001/29/CE, requiring harmonization of copyright law throughout the EU, it did not incorporate graduated response into the new law. 214 Rights owners persisted, however, and the idea soon resurfaced in a 2007 report sponsored by the French Ministry of Culture, which proposed the creation of an administrative body that would oversee a system of warnings and sanctions. 215 French ISPs initially agreed to the proposal along with other stakeholders, but they withdrew their support before long, leading supporters of graduated response to seek a legislative mandate. 216 In 2008, the French Minister of Culture and Communication introduced legislation creating the administrative body proposed in the 2007 report. 217 The body, HADOPI, 218 was to be responsible for implementing a graduated response system in which three warning letters would be followed by a suspension of the accused subscriber's Internet access for a maximum of one year. 219 Debate over the bill was intense both inside and outside the French parliament, with the greatest degree of controversy surrounding privacy and due process suspended. 229 If the judge determines that the infringement was the result of a negligent failure on the subscriber's part to secure his or her Internet connection, the suspension is limited to one month. 230 If the judge determines that the infringement was not merely negligent, a one-year suspension may be imposed. 231 If the subscriber wants to contest the judge's decision to suspend access, he or she can exercise the right to be heard on appeal. 232 The HADOPI system is still quite new, and it remains to be seen where along the road the inevitable bumps will arise. In terms of volume, as many as 25,000 infringements per day are expected to be reported 233 -enough to tax even the most streamlined of systems. Unlike Lemley and Reese's proposed system, which limits administrative ADR to cases in which a single user is alleged to have shared fifty or more files at one time, the jurisdiction of HADOPI is not subject to any minimum volume threshold. Rights owners can thus funnel every detected infringement into the system, resulting in a substantial burden. 234 The lack of a minimum volume threshold also means that an accused infringer in France could be subject to suspension of Internet access after only three isolated file transfers over a period of eighteen months.
The HADOPI framework, as amended to comply with the requirements of the French Constitutional Council, shares with Lemley and Reese's plan the overarching goal of creating an efficient but fair administrative system for deciding claims of copyright infringement involving P2P file sharing. Both systems are designed to alleviate the burdens and delays to all parties associated with litigation, which has proven not to scale well for adjudicating claims involving P2P. Both systems attempt to balance the need for prompt, effective enforcement with the right of alleged infringers to a fair and neutral adjudication of the claims against them. Neither system [Vol. 13:4:695 manages to preserve all of the due process protections associated with litigation, but it would be impossible to do so in a scalable way. Incorporating the right to contest allegations and limiting the duration of access-related sanctions help to mitigate harms to Internet users under both systems.
V. CONCLUSION
With each successive iteration, P2P network architecture has become not only more scalable and efficient, but also more perfectly adapted to "massive infringement." The key to effective online copyright enforcement in the P2P context is identifying and implementing enforcement strategies that are commensurately scalable.
While the DMCA has scaled well with respect to enforcement of copyrights in hosted content, it has not scaled well at all for infringements over P2P networks. Rights owners continue to engage in mass John Doe litigation for convenience and efficiency, but litigation does not scale well either, particularly when the parties being aggregated en masse are defendants.
There are, however, litigation substitutes worth exploring, including voluntary notice-forwarding arrangements between ISPs and rights owners and streamlined systems of alternative dispute resolution designed specifically for the P2P context. Such systems, including the newly implemented HADOPI system in France, are untried but could succeed in proportion to their ability to honor the competing values of efficiency and fairness. Any high-volume system for enforcing copyrights online that is not both "architected" and implemented to balance these competing values will not scale and cannot succeed over the long term.
